

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC		X		
17	C/AF/DO		X		
18	NIO/AF		X		
19	D/LA/DI		X		
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks

(ER)

Executive Secretary  
3 DEC 85  
Date



3637 (10-81)

STAT

STEVE SYMMS  
IDAHO

Executive Registry

85- 4744

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 1, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I gave a copy of the attached paper, suggesting a new policy on southern Africa, to Secretary Shultz several weeks ago. His recent reply proposed that I raise my expressed concerns with the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.

Having pursued discussions with key State Department officials in the past about this issue, I believe the matter sufficiently urgent to be dealt with at a higher level. I have forwarded copies of my paper to several top Administration officials, and respectfully encourage you to consider a full review of southern African policy at the next Cabinet meeting.

Your strong supporters in Congress were heartened by your speech at the United Nations referring to Angola, and your remarks implying that U.S. policy towards Angola would be aligned with that towards Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Congress is leaning towards lending aid, either humanitarian or military, to the Angolan freedom fighters, and a supportive Administration position would be most helpful to that effort.

Sincerely,



Steve Symms  
United States Senator

Enclosure

cc: The Honorable Caspar Weinberger  
The Honorable George Shultz  
The Honorable William Casey  
Mrs. Anne Armstrong  
The Honorable Robert McFarland



PLEASE REPLY TO:

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
IDAHO FALLS OFFICE	POCATELLO OFFICE	TWIN FALLS OFFICE	BOISE OFFICE	LEWISTON OFFICE	MOSCOW OFFICE	COEUR D'ALENE OFFICE
1 FEDERAL BUILDING	207 FEDERAL BUILDING	401 2ND ST. N. #108	Box 1190	LEWIS-CLARK PLAZA	105 FEDERAL BUILDING	305 FEDERAL BUILDING
IDAHO FALLS 8340						COEUR D'ALENE 83814
(208) 522-9779						4-5490

C-301

U.S. AFRICAN POLICY: THE OPPORTUNITY AND NEED FOR A PRO-WESTERN STRATEGY

U.S. OBJECTIVES--PROPOSAL FOR A NEW APPROACH

In January, 1985, President Reagan declared, in his State of the Union address, that "the U.S. should and will support those fighting for freedom...from Afghanistan to Nicaragua..." The Congress has now lifted the Clark Amendment restrictions, which had prevented U.S. military or paramilitary assistance to the pro-Western armed resistance movement in Angola. This offers a major opportunity for a new policy with the following mutually-reinforcing objectives:

1) Angola: shift to a U.S. policy of support for the pro-western armed resistance movement of UNITA and its goals of a "national unity" government, to include moderate elements of the current government, leading to genuinely democratic elections and the removal of the Cuban/Soviet bloc occupation forces.

Mozambique: shift to a U.S. policy of full support for the pro-western armed resistance, RENAMO, and work with friendly governments to bring about a "national unity" coalition between RENAMO and the least pro-Soviet elements of the current communist government.

Namibia: help the pro-democratic Namibian political groups to organize so that they can compete effectively in genuinely democratic elections to be held under supervision of an international commission of genuinely democratic countries--not the United Nations, which has a conflict of interest, since it has already recognized the communist SWAPO guerrilla organization as "the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people."

4) Republic of South Africa: It should be the goal of U.S. policy in southern Africa to assist in the development of capitalistic, pluralistic, multi-party, multi-racial societies based on the consent of the governed. This is best accomplished through a process which constructively engages legitimate parties in a peaceful, evolutionary process leading to systems which protect the rights of all persons and groups and is based on non-violent change. While encouraging peaceful evolution from the apartheid system, we must assure that the communist-led violent opposition groups are unable to bring a hostile, anti-western repressive dictatorship to power in the name of equal rights for all. The U.S. should identify and enhance the

standing of moderate and peaceful anti-apartheid groups like Inkatha, and end the legitimization of terrorist, pro-Soviet groups such as the ANC and the Azanian People's Organization.

#### The Current Situation in the Region

Angola: three black groups sought independence from Portugal--the communist and pro-Soviet MPLA, founded in 1956 by Angolans, who were members of the Portuguese and French communist parties; the pro-Western FNLA, which attracted a major MPLA leader and 3,000 of his troops in 1974; and pro-Western UNITA, led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi. The Alvor agreement of January 15, 1975 was signed by all three groups. It called for each group to contribute 8,000 men, with these 24,000 to join with 24,000 Portuguese as an interim force to maintain order while democratic elections decided who should govern an independent Angola. Instead, the Soviet Union increased the flow of weapons to the MPLA in October 1974, which increased even more in early 1975; 200 Cuban military advisors arrived in April 1975 to train MPLA forces in the use of Soviet weapons, such as light tanks, field artillery, rocket launchers. In August 1975, elements of the Cuban general staff arrived; and later that month, the first of the more than 15,000 Cuban troops arrived, with a massive Soviet airlift of weapons which directly strengthened the MPLA. A small South African force (1,500) entered southern Angola in mid-October to help the FNLA. It was withdrawn in December when the U.S. Congress refused to provide aid to any of the competing groups.

The communist MPLA has been the government since 1976. It has an army of at least 60,000 which receives substantial Soviet bloc support and weapons and has continually been supported by about 35,000 (other estimates are as high as 37,000-45,000) Cuban troops. The MPLA has a social base in one tribe accounting for about 23% of the population; although there is now significant support from other tribes. UNITA represents about 42% of the population, has an estimated 55,000 under arms, and has established a ten-year record of military improvement, coherent strategy, and effective government in the areas it controls.

MOZAMBIQUE: The pro-Soviet communist government was established in 1975. It has ruled by repression; and the combination of communist economics and drought has led to severe economic decline, including mass starvation in some regions. The government is opposed by a pro-Western armed resistance movement, RENAMO, which despite the peace agreement between South Africa and Mozambique, continues to wreak havoc on the Mozambique economy. In desperation, the Mozambique

government has turned to the U.S. and other Western countries for substantial economic aid.

Namibia: SWAPO (Southwest Africa People's Organization) is a pro-Soviet guerrilla organization which seeks power over Namibia and which the U.N. (General Assembly) has designated as the "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people." It has an estimated armed strength of 7,000 and has been consistently supported by the Soviet bloc/Cuba and by the pro-Soviet regimes in the area, including Angola and Mozambique. Pro-democratic political organizations exist in Namibia, and these include the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. Pro-Western and democratic Namibians believe that a U.N.-supervised electoral process, under the terms of U.N. Resolution 435, would result in a SWAPO victory because the U.N. has declared itself in favor of SWAPO, and therefore, cannot be a guarantor of impartial elections, and because SWAPO's terrorist apparatus would be used to coerce voters. South Africa recently established a Namibian transitional government, and thereby initiated the move towards democratic self-government.

Republic of South Africa: There are several competing coalitions: communist-led organizations, such as the ANC, and its front organization, the UDF, which use violence and anti-apartheid sentiment in order to destabilize the current government with the aim of taking power; elements of the white population which seek peaceful evolutionary change which will end apartheid; a minority of whites that want no further reform and fear erosion of their status; and non-violent black groups, as well as coloureds and Indians that also seek the peaceful elimination of apartheid and political accommodation. The South African communist groups are supported by and cooperate with SWAPO, the Soviet bloc, Cuba, the pro-Soviet regimes in the region (Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe), as well as other elements of the pro-Soviet terrorist network, such as Libya, and the full range of communist propaganda and front organizations. The U.S. government should promote and enhance the image and influence of the moderate, non-violent reform groups of all races within the RSA, and encourage their cooperation in the abolition of apartheid.

## THE FAILURE OF THE CURRENT POLICY APPROACH

The basic premise of the current policy is that if South Africa permits U.N.-supervised elections in Namibia, these will be genuinely democratic, and Cuba will concurrently withdraw a substantial number of its troops from Angola. There are two basic flaws in this approach. First, U.N.-supervised elections will most likely produce a Namibia dominated by the communist SWAPO movement because the U.N. has long been biased towards SWAPO. Second, Cuba is unalterably opposed to withdrawal of troops below the level required to continue propping up the pro-Soviet regime, unless military casualties and losses force Castro to do so.

The State Department describes four goals of its policy. The following is a summary of claimed progress and an alternative assessment.

Re-establish U.S. influence and reduce Soviet influence:

Claimed progress--"seized strategic initiative from Soviets, shifted focus from military to diplomatic solutions"; "Mozambique and Angola looked to U.S., not Soviets for solutions to their security problems."

Our assessment--Soviet influence continues as long as the pro-Soviet regimes remain; pro-Soviet groups are expanding their violence against South Africa; Mozambique and Angola look to the U.S. for economic aid, and hope misguided U.S. diplomacy will demoralize the pro-Western armed opposition groups and give the communist governments more time to consolidate and build their power.

Reduce regional violence:

Claimed progress--U.S. diplomacy helped Mozambique and South Africa reach the Nkomati Accord which ended both governments' support for cross-border violence; U.S. brought South Africa and Angola to the Lusaka Agreement to end South Africa's activities in Angola, and SWAPO's in Namibia.

Our assessment--the first agreement has helped the communist government in Mozambique and hurt the pro-Western armed resistance there; the second agreement is consistently violated by SWAPO (SWAPO: 150 violations; RSA: 4 violations) and, again, has the effect of helping a communist government rather than the pro-Western resistance movement. The ANC claims Nkomati actually precipitated the current violence in South Africa by transplanting ANC militants from Mozambique back into South Africa.

Namibian settlement:

Claimed progress--obtain South African recommitment to U.N. Resolution 435 along with SWAPO and regional states agreement to this.

Our assessment--this U.N. Resolution will, if implemented, result in unfair elections leading to SWAPO dominance.

Suggestions for Specific U.S. Actions to Implement a Pro-Western Strategy

ANGOLA:

Shift diplomatic objectives to the attainment of a pro-Western coalition of UNITA and current moderate government elements.

Under terms of current U.S. law, immediately begin providing humanitarian assistance to UNITA, encourage all U.S. allies to do the same, and consider military aid options.

Work with Portugal where both the Social Democrats and Centrists are realistic about communism, and persuade European allies to shift to a pro-Western strategy (Portugal, the U.K., the F.R.G. most likely could cooperate immediately with U.S. encouragement).

NAMIBIA:

U.S. and allies should immediately begin providing help to the genuinely democratic leaders and institutions.

U.S. and allies should agree upon a democratic group of countries to supervise future elections.

U.S. and allies should seek to reverse the U.N. endorsement of SWAPO and mount a major communications effort to tell the truth about the communist affiliations of the organization.

Portugal, West Germany, and the U.S. should cooperate in designing the specific political strategy.

U.S. should demonstrate a new approach by proceeding with certain clearly defined acts leaving no doubt about our position, to include opening an interests section in Namibia, and withdrawing the current official State Department letter which discourages American business investment in Namibia.

MOZAMBIQUE:

U.S. diplomacy should shift its objectives to obtaining a pro-Western Mozambique through a coalition between RENAMO and elements of the current government.

U.S. and allies should immediately provide aid to RENAMO.

U.S. should use its economic aid and humanitarian assistance to strengthen pro-Western political organization.

U.S. and allies should mount a public diplomacy effort as above.



UNITED STATES SENATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

PUBLIC DOCUMENT

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

The Honorable William Casey  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505



*Steve Symms*  
U.S.S.